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Abstract
Providing users with alternatives to choose from is an essential component in many
online platforms, making the accurate prediction of choice vital to their success.
A renewed interest in learning choice models has led to significant progress in
modeling power, but most current methods are either limited in the types of choice
behavior they capture, cannot be applied to large-scale data, or both.
Here we propose a learning framework for predicting choice that is accurate,
versatile, theoretically grounded, and scales well. Our key modeling point is that to
account for how humans choose, predictive models must capture certain set-related
invariances. Building on recent results in economics, we derive a class of models
that can express any behavioral choice pattern, enjoy favorable sample complexity
guarantees, and can be efficiently trained end-to-end. Experiments on three large
choice datasets demonstrate the utility of our approach.
1 Introduction
One of the most prevalent activities of online users is choosing. In almost any online platform, users
constantly face choices: what to purchase, who to follow, where to dine, what to watch, and even
simply where to click. As the prominence of online services becomes ever more reliant on such
choices, the accurate prediction of choice is quickly becoming vital to their success. The availability
of large-scale choice data has spurred hopes of feasible individual-level prediction, and many recent
works have been devoted to the modeling and prediction of choice [3, 31, 15, 14, 23, 36, 24, 6, 29].
In a typical choice scenario, a user is presented with a set of items s = {x1, . . . , xk}, xi ∈ X ,
called the choice set. Of these, the user chooses an item y ∈ s. In economics this is known as the
problem of discrete choice [16]. We let the collection of choice sets X include all sets of at most n
items, X = ∪k≤nX k, and assume choice sets and choices are drawn i.i.d. from an unknown joint
distribution D. Given a set of m examples S = {(si, yi)}mi=1 sampled from D, our goal is to learn a
choice predictor yˆ = h(s) that generalizes well to unseen sets, i.e., has low expected error w.r.t. D.
A natural way to predict choice is to learn a score function f(x) over items. If f learns to score
chosen items higher than their alternatives, then the argmax rule hf (s) = argmaxx∈s Pf (x|s) where
Pf (x|s) ∝ ef(x) will lead to good predictions. This approach may seem appealing, but is in fact
constrained by an undesired artifact known as the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) [16]:
Definition 1. For any s ∈ X and a, b ∈ s, IIA holds if P (a|{a, b})/P (b|{a, b}) = P (a|s)/P (b|s).
IIA states that the likelihood of choosing a over b should not depend on what other alternatives are
available. This means that for any choice set s, if y ∈ s is predicted for s, then y will also be predicted
out of any subset of items s′ ⊂ s in which y is included . IIA is a rigid constraint that imposes a
fundamental limitation on what choice behavior can be expressed, and cannot be mitigated by simply
increasing score function complexity (e.g., adding layers or clever non-linearities). From a practical
point of view, this is discouraging, as there is ample empirical evidence of regular and consistent
violations of IIA in real choice data (e.g., [33]). This has led to a surge of interest in machine learning
models that go beyond IIA [25, 27, 3, 31, 28, 32, 6, 34, 30].
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The naïve way to avoid IIA is to directly model all possible subsets, but this is likely to make learning
intractable [22, 34]. A common approach for resolving this difficulty is to impose structure, typically
in the form of a probabilistic choice model encoding certain inter-item dependencies. While allowing
for violations, this approach presents several practical limitations: First, explicitly modeling the
dependency structure restricts how IIA can be violated. Second, as these methods focus mostly on
asymptotic properties (e.g., consistency) rather than on finite-sample expected accuracy, they may
not perform well in practice. Finally, surprisingly few of these methods apply to large-scale online
choice data, where the number of instances can be prohibitively large, choice sets rarely appear more
than once, and items can be complex structured objects whose number is virtually unbounded.
To complement most current works, and motivated by the growing need for accuracy and scalability,
here we propose a framework for choice prediction that is purely discriminative, and hence directly
optimizes for accuracy. Our framework is based on the idea of set-dependent aggregation, a principled
approach in economics for modeling IIA violations [1], that to the best of our knowledge has not been
considered from a machine learning perspective. The challenge in designing a useful discriminative
choice framework that supports violations is twofold. On the one hand, it must be general enough to
allow for IIA violations without explicitly modeling how they can occur. On the other hand, it must
be specific enough to efficiently capture actual behavioral violations emerging form the data. In this
paper, we show that set-dependent aggregation achieves both. Specifically, our framework makes the
following contributions:
• Efficient and scalable discriminative training. Our approach is geared towards predictive
performance: it directly optimizes for accuracy, can be efficiently trained end-to-end, and scales
well to realistically large and complex prediction scenarios.
• Rigorous error bounds. We bound both approximation and estimation error of aggregation.
Our results show how the complexity of the hypothesis class controls the type and number of
accountable violations, uncovering a data-driven mechanism for targeting important violations.
• Behavioral inductive bias. Aggregation can provably express any form of violation [1], but
may require an intractable number of parameters to do so. To control for overfitting, we infuse
our model with inductive bias taken from behavioral decision theory, balancing flexibility and
specificity without imposing any explicit structure.
• Thorough empirical evaluation. We conduct experiments on three large choice datasets —flight
itineraries, hotel reservations, and news recommendations— demonstrating the utility of our
approach. Our analysis reveals how accuracy is driven by the flexibility in modeling violations,
which resonates well with our theoretical results.
Overall, our work presents a practical and theoretically-grounded approach for predicting choice.
Paper organization. We begin with a review of the related literature (Sec. 1.1). We then present our
model of set-dependent aggregation in Sec. 2. This is followed in Sec. 3 by our main theoretical
results, bounding the approximation error (Sec. 3.1) and estimation error (Sec. 3.2) of aggregators.
Finally, we present our experimental results in Sec. 4, and give concluding remarks in Sec. 5.
1.1 Related material
IIA begins with Luce’s Axiom of Choice [16], which for a certain noise distribution, induces the
popular Multinomial Logit model (MNL) [20, 39]. Two common extensions— Nested MNL and
Mixed MNL —relax IIA by grouping items via a tree structure [19] or modeling a mixture population
[21], respectively. These, however, pose restrictive assumptions on the nature of violations, require
elaborate hand-coded auxiliary inputs, and are in many cases intractable. Although recent progress
has alleviated some difficulties [25, 3, 6], applying these models in practice remains difficult. Recent
works have proposed other probabilistic models that deviate from IIA, by modeling pairwise utilities
[32], kth-order interactions [31, 34], and general subset relations [4]. These, however, do not optimize
for predictive accuracy, and rarely apply to complex choice settings with many items and sparse
choice sets. Others suggest discriminative solutions, but these include models that tend to be either
over-specific or over-general [23, 30] and provide no guarantees as to what violations can be captured.
Our work draws on the literature of utility aggregation (or “multi-self” models), studied extensively in
economics [11, 7, 18, 8, 1], psychology [41, 35, 44], and marketing [13]. While these typically focus
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(a) Linear: 〈v, F (x)〉 (b) SDW: 〈w(s), F (x)〉 (c) SDE: 〈v, ϕ(x, s)〉
Figure 1: An illustration of how set-dependent aggregation can violate IIA. Points represent an
embedding of items in R` with ` = 2. Two sets are shown: s and s′ = s \ {x} for some x ∈ s.
IIA dictates that removing x from s does not change the prediction yˆ. This is the case for linear
aggregation (a), where neither weights v ∈ R` or embedding mapping ϕ depend on the set. When
weights w are a function of s, removing an item can change the scoring direction (b). When ϕ is a
function of s, removing an item can change the spatial position of items (c). Both of these allow s
and s′ to have different maximizing items, and hence different predictions.
on mathematical tractability or behavioral plausibility, our focus is on statistical and computational
aspects relevant to machine learning. Our work is largely inspired by recent results in economics on
the expressivity of aggregation [1]. While they give worst-case guarantees for unparameterized items
under the realizability assumption, our results study the statistical behavior of parametric aggregation.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to provide rigorous finite-sample error bounds for
set-dependent aggregation in the context of choice prediction.
2 Proposed Model
At the core of our approach is the idea of aggregation: combining a collection of item score functions
F = (f1, . . . , f`) into a single score function g. We refer to ` as the aggregation dimension.
Aggregation is a popular approach to enriching the hypothesis class, but it is easy to show that
standard forms of aggregation (e.g., linear aggregation 〈v, F (x)〉, v ∈ R` as in bagging or boosting)
are still bound to IIA. Hence, to express violations, aggregation must be set-dependent. Our model is
a combination of two powerful set-dependent aggregation mechanisms (illustrated in Fig. 1):
Set-dependent weights: Let s ∈ X. Starting with g(x; v) = 〈v, F (x)〉, consider replacing each
scalar weight vi with a set function wi(· ) : X→ R. This gives the following aggregation model:
SDW: g(x, s;w) = 〈w(s), F (x)〉, w(s) = (w1(s), . . . , w`(s)) (1)
Denote yˆ = argmaxx∈s〈w(s), F (x)〉, and let s′ = s \ {x} for some x 6= yˆ. Recall that IIA is
violated when removing x from s changes the prediction. Here, because removing x changes the
input to each wi, the contribution of each fi ∈ F to g changes from wi(s) to wi(s′). Geometrically,
the scoring direction changes, and therefore the choice prediction can change as well (Fig. 1b).
Set-dependent embeddings: Now, consider instead replacing each item score function fi ∈ F with
an item-centric set function ϕi(· , · ) : X × X→ R. The aggregation model is now:
SDE: g(x, s; v, ϕ) = 〈v, ϕ(x, s)〉, ϕ(x, s) = (ϕ1(x, s), . . . , ϕ`(x, s)) (2)
The vector ϕ(x, s) is a set-dependent embedding of x (the dependence on F is implicit). The predicted
item is that whose embedding is closest to v’s. Here, when the set changes (i.e., by removing an
item), items shift in the embedded space, and the prediction can change (Fig. 1c).
Our final and most general set-dependent aggregation model combines both mechanisms:
SDA: g(x, s;w,ϕ) = 〈w(s), ϕ(x, s)〉 (3)
We now describe the learning framework and propose a concrete architecture for SDA.
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2.1 Learning
Our goal is to learn an aggregator g that minimizes the expected risk ε(g) = ED[∆(y, g(s))] where
∆ is the 0/1 loss. We approximate this by minimizing the empirical risk:
min
g∈G
m∑
i=1
∆(yi, g(si)) + λR(g), ∆(y, g(s)) = 1{hg(s) 6=y} (4)
where G is an aggregator class, and R is a regularization term with coefficient λ, Note that the
decision rule hg(s) = argmaxx∈s g(x, s) is now set-dependent. Because aggregation is simply a
template for combining score functions, if F , w, and ϕ are differentiable, g is differentiable as well,
and can therefore be efficiently optimized end-to-end using standard gradient methods. In Sec. 3 we
bound the expected risk of aggregator classes G.
2.2 Inductive bias
To allow for efficient learning, we implement w(s) and ϕ(x, s) using key principles from behavioral
choice theory, suggesting that the choices are based on a relative, a-symmetric, and context-dependent
perception of utility. In accordance, we instantiate:
w(s) = w(F (s)), ϕ(x, s) = µ
(
F (x)− r(F (s))) (5)
where F (s) = {F (x)}x∈s. Here, F models item utilities, r is a set-specific reference point for
comparing utilities [42], µ is a loss-averse evaluation mechanism [10, 43], and w integrates multiple
evaluations in a context-dependent manner [40, 44]. This construction generalizes many models from
the fields of economics, psychology, and marketing:
Claim 1. The aggregation model in Eq. (5) generalizes choice models in [40, 20, 19, 12, 11, 13, 26].
See Appendix A for details. In practice, we implement F , w and r using appropriate neural networks,
and µ using an a-symmetric s-shaped nonlinearity [17].
3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section we bound the expected risk of aggregators. Our results demonstrate the power of
set-dependent aggregation: expressive enough to allow for arbitrary violations, and concise enough
to be efficiently learned. The risk of any g ∈ G breaks down into two fundamental error types [37]:
ε(g) = ε∗(G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
approximation
+ ε(g)− ε∗(G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
estimation
, ε∗G = min
g′∈G
εD(g
′) (6)
Approximation error is a property of the class G, measuring its suitability for examples drawn from
D. Estimation error is specific to g, measuring its performance relative to g∗. Our results show that
the tradeoff in both errors is controlled by two factors: the complexity of the utility function class F
and the aggregation dimension `.
3.1 Approximation Error
Our first result shows how aggregation combines predictors that cannot express violations into a
model that can account for any form of violation. Our main theorem reveals how this is achieved:
aggregation uses score functions to ‘isolate’ regions of violating sets, and within each region, operate
independently. Technically, this is shown by decomposing the approximation error of G over these
regions, where the error in each region depends on the error of F .
We begin with some definitions. Recall that IIA mandates that if y is chosen from s, then it should
also be chosen from any s′ ⊆ s with y ∈ s′. This motivates a definition of IIA violation due to [1]:1
Definition 2 (IIA Violation, [1]). A set s violates IIA if there exists s′ ⊃ s with c(s) 6= c(s′) ∈ s.
Denote the set of all violating sets by V and non-violating sets by U = X \ V . Let the predicate
sfs′ be true if f scores items in s higher than items in s′, i.e., f(x) > f(x′) ∀x ∈ s, x′ ∈ s′.
1 The definition in [1] additionally requires s to be of maximal size, which they need for a counting argument.
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Definition 3 (Separation). A score function f separates s if sfX \ s, defining the separable region:
Ωf = {s ∈ V : s is separated by f}
We are now ready to state our main result (see Appendix B for proof and further details).
Theorem 1. The approximation error ε∗(G) decomposes over:
1. non-violating sets with risk at most ε∗(F|U)
2. separable violating regions with risk at most ε∗(F|Ωf ) per region
and the set of separable regions is optimal under budget constraint `. Specifically, we have:
ε∗(G) ≤
∑
R∈U∪ΩF
pR ε
∗(F|R) + pV \ΩF (7)
for the optimal F ∈ F`′ , where ΩF = ∪f∈FΩf , `′ ≤ (`− 1)/5, and pA = P (s ∈ A).
Theorem 1 hints at how aggregation can account for violations: it partitions X into regions, and
applies F to each region independently. In this process, F plays a corresponding dual role of both
determining separable regions Ωf and predicting within these regions. This demonstrates how the
type of accountable violations is controlled by the expressivity ofF , and how the number of violations
(via the number of regions) is controlled by `. In principal, aggregation can account for any violation:
Corollary 1. If y = c(s) for some choice function c and for all s ∈ X, then with sufficiently large `
and sufficiently expressive F , the approximation error vanishes, i.e., ε∗(G) = 0.2
Our proof takes the main building blocks of [1]— objects called “triple bases” —and carefully weaves
them within a statistical framework. As in [1], results apply to classes satisfying a natural property
of scale-invariance; these include all but one model from Claim 1. The main lemma in the proof
requires that G is defined over an auxiliary neural-network class of score functions that is slightly
richer than F , and shows how “implementing” triple bases using simple neural circuits enables a
decomposition of the error over violating regions.
The general statement of Theorem 1 is that the more complex F and the larger `, the better the
approximation error. Our next results quantifies how this trades off with estimation error.
3.2 Estimation Error
Our next results establish the learnability of aggregation. We give sample complexity bounds on
the empirical risk εS(g) = ES [∆(y, g(s))] showing how learning both weight and embedding
mechanisms (Sec. 2) depends on F , `, and the aggregation components in g. Proofs are based on
Rademacher bounds and are given in Appendix C. To simplify the analysis, we focus on set operations
and on a linear base class:
Fρlin = {F (x) = x>Θ : Θ ∈ Rd×`, ‖Θ‖ρ ≤ 1}
where ‖· ‖ρ is the induced ρ-norm. This suffices to cover the models from Claim 1.3
For any function q, we denote its Lipschitz constant by λq when it is scalar-valued and by λρq when it
is vector valued and with respect to the ρ-norm. We also use Xρ = maxx∈s∈S ‖x‖ρ.
The first bound applies to the set-dependent weight mechanism (Eq. (1)).
Theorem 2. Let G be a class of aggregators over F∞lin of the form g(x, s) = 〈w(s), F (x)〉. Then for
all D and any δ ∈ [0, 1], it holds that
ε(G) ≤ εS(G) + 4X2∞λρw
√
2 log 2d
m
+O
(√
log(1/δ)
m
)
with probability of at least 1− δ.
2 Here we assume that the approximation error does not include the irreducible error.
3 All except for one of the three models proposed in [13].
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Figure 2: The proposed aggregation model
The second bound applies to the set-dependent embedding mechanism (Eq. (2)), where for concrete-
ness we set ϕ according to the inductive bias model in Eq. (5).
Theorem 3. Let G be a class of aggregators over F1lin of the form g(x, s) = 〈v, ϕ(x, s)〉 where
ϕ(x, s) = 〈w, µ(F (x)− r(s))〉 as in Eq. (5). Then for all D and any δ ∈ [0, 1], it holds that
ε(G) ≤ εS(G) + 4W1X∞λµ(1 + λρr)
√
2 log 2d
m
+O
(√
log(1/δ)
m
)
with probability of at least 1− δ, where W1 = ‖w‖1.
Both results show what governs learnability: the dimension ` plays an implicit role via the Lipschitz
constants of the set operations, and F effects the bound via the norm of w (also depending on `).
4 Experiments
We now present our experimental evaluation on click prediction tasks on online platforms.
Datasets. We evaluate our method on three large datasets: flight itineraries from Amadeus4, hotel
reservations from Expedia5, and news recommendations from Outbrain6. Each dataset includes
sets of alternatives and the corresponding user choices. We focus on examples where users clicked
on exactly one item. Features describe items (e.g., price, quality, or category) and context (e.g.,
query, date and time). Unfortunately, for reasons of privacy, very little user information is available.
Appendix D.1 includes further details.
Baselines. We compare against three baseline categories: methods that satisfy IIA, methods that
target specific violations of IIA, and methods that do not satisfy IIA but also do not directly model
violations. This lets us explore whether capturing IIA violations is useful, and if so, what form of
deviation is preferable. We focus on approaches that can be applied to large-scale data as the above.
For IIA methods, we use Multinomial Logit (MNL) [20, 39], SVMRank [9], and RankNet [5]. These
methods predict based on item-centric score functions, but differ in the way they are optimized. For
non-IIA methods, we use a discrete Mixed MNL model [39], AdaRank [45], and Deep Sets [46].
These differ in how they consider item dependencies: Mixed MNL models user populations, ListNet
captures set dependencies via the loss function, and Deep Sets attempts to universally approximate
general set functions. We also compare to simple baselines based on price or quality, and to random.
Aggregation models. For our approach, we evaluate the performance of three models, each corre-
sponding to one of the aggregation mechanisms from Sec. 2.
• Set-dependent weights: g(x, s) = 〈w(s), F (x)〉 [SDW, Eq. (1)]
• Set-dependent embeddings: g(x, s) = 〈v, ϕ(x, s)〉 [SDE, Eq. (2)]
• Combined inductive bias model: g(x, s) = 〈w(s), ϕ(x, s)〉 [SDA, Eq. (3)]
The set function w is implemented by a small permutation-invariant neural network [46] having 2
hidden layers of size 16 with tanh activations and use mean pooling. In the combined model, we
use a slight generalization of Eq. (3), letting ϕ(x, s) = µ(〈F (x), r(s)〉) where F and r are now
4See [23]
5www.kaggle.com/c/expedia-personalized-sort
6www.kaggle.com/c/outbrain-click-prediction
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Amadeus Expedia Outbrain
Top-1 Top-5 MRR Top-1 Top-5 MRR Top-1 Top-5 MRR
O
ur
s SDA 45.42±0.5 93.37±0.0 2.31±0.3 31.49±0.2 86.91±0.2 2.99±0.0 38.04±0.3 94.54±0.1 2.42±0.0
SDE 39.62±0.4 91.70±0.3 2.52±0.0 31.47±0.2 86.52±0.2 3.00±0.0 37.59±0.3 94.26±0.1 2.44±0.0
SDW 39.98±0.4 91.89±0.3 2.50±0.0 31.27±0.2 86.67±0.2 2.99±0.0 37.86±0.3 94.48±0.2 2.43±0.0
II
A
MNL [20] 38.42±0.5 91.02±0.3 2.57±0.0 30.06±0.2 86.34±0.1 3.07±0.0 37.74±0.3 94.52±0.2 2.43±0.0
SVMRank [9] 40.27±0.4 91.94±0.3 2.49±0.0 31.28±0.2 86.24±0.1 3.01±0.0 37.68±0.3 94.46±0.1 2.43±0.0
RankNet [5] 37.44±0.7 84.67±1.7 3.02±0.1 23.82±0.5 81.85±0.6 3.43±0.0 35.32±0.8 91.55±0.7 2.65±0.1
no
n-
II
A Mixed MNL [39] 37.96±0.3 90.40±0.3 2.62±0.0 27.28±0.6 84.24±0.3 3.22±0.0 37.72±0.3 94.42±0.1 2.43±0.0
AdaRank [45] 37.27±0.4 72.34±0.3 4.03±0.0 26.70±0.2 83.21±0.2 3.29±0.0 37.47±0.3 94.40±0.2 2.44±0.0
Deep Sets [46] 40.36±0.5 91.92±0.3 2.48±0.0 29.87±0.3 86.26±0.2 3.06±0.0 37.51±0.3 94.30±0.1 2.44±0.0
ba
si
c Price/Quality 36.44±0.3 87.23±0.2 2.79±0.0 17.92±0.1 77.67±0.1 3.79±0.0 24.17±0.1 25.08±0.1 8.13±0.0
Random 25.15±0.5 32.87±0.6 6.49±0.0 14.13±0.1 32.35±0.2 6.38±0.0 22.21±0.1 23.10±0.1 8.32±0.0
Table 1: Main results. Values are averaged over 10 random splits (standard errors in small font).
vector-valued, and are compared by an inner product. For the a-symmetric sigmoidal µ we use a
‘kinked’ tanh, and r has the same architecture as w but outputs a vector. Figure 2 illustrates this
architecture. As noted, these design choices follow key principles from behavioral choice theory.
Appendix D.4 includes further details and ablation studies.
To highlight the contribution of aggregation, for all models we use a simple linear base class F ,
allowing a clean differential comparison to IIA methods such as MNL (linear score functions, no set
operations) and to non-IIA methods such as DeepSets (neural set functions, no linear components).
Our main results use ` = 24, which strikes a good balance between performance and runtime (in
general, accuracy increases with `, but most of the gain is already reached at ` = 4; see Fig. 3 left).
Setup. Results are based on averaging 10 random 50:25:25 train-validation-test splits. The methods
we consider are varied in their expressive power and computational requirements. Hence, for a
fair comparison (and to allow reasonable run times), each trial includes 10,000 randomly sampled
examples. Performance is measured using top-1 accuracy, top-5 accuracy, and mean reciprocal rank
(MRR). For all methods we tuned regularization, dropout, and learning rate (when applicable) using
Bayesian optimization. Default parameters were used for other hyper-parameters. For optimization
we used Adam with step-wise exponential decay. See Appendix D.3 for further details.
4.1 Results
Our main results are presented in Table 1, which compares the different methods for choice sets up
to 10, 10, 12 items for each dataset (the full results for a range of maximal number of items can be
found in Appendix D.5). As can bee seen, SDA outperforms other baselines in all settings.
When comparing predictive top-1 accuracy, non-IIA methods tend to outperform IIA methods by a
margin. Discrete Mixed MNL, which deviates from IIA by targeting certain inter-item dependencies,
is observed as the most competitive baseline. DeepSets, which is our most general non-IIA baseline,
shows mixed results, and relatively high standard errors. Deepsets portrays the invariances required
for expressing violations with significantly more parameters than SDA (Appendix D.2), but lacks the
inductive bias that SDA holds, thus demonstrating the importance of the latter.
For measures that extend beyond the first item (such as top-5 and MRR), IIA ranking methods
perform well, likely because their objective consider relations between items. Nonetheless, they are
still outperformed by SDA, even though its objective considers only the top item. We conjecture that
training SDA with a ranking loss will increase performance further.
4.2 Analysis
Accuracy and violation capacity. Figure 3 (left) presents the accuracy of an aggregator for increas-
ing `. Results show that accuracy steadily increases, although roughly 90% of the gain is accuracy
is achieved by ` = 4. Theorem 1 suggests that increasing ` helps by covering additional regions of
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Figure 3: Left: Accuracy (blue) and violation c apacity κ (red) are highly correlated. Most of the
accuracy gain is achieved by ` = 4. Center: Accuracy of SDA vs. the choice models it generalizes
(Claim 1), showing the benefit of replacing hand-crafted elements with neural components. Right:
MNL and Deep Sets represent two extremes: inability to express violations (κ = 0, dark blue), and
over-flexibility (κ = 1, dark red). SDA finds middle ground by properly allocating its violation
‘budget’, focusing mostly on samples that MNL gets wrong (mean κ in light red).
violating sets. To empirically quantify this, we measure violation capacity:
κS(g) =
1
|S|
∑
(s,y)∈S
1
|s| − 1
∑
y 6=x∈s
1{g(x, s−x) 6= y} (8)
where s−x = s \ {x}. Violation capacity measures how frequently the prediction changes when
single items are removed from the choice set, and is a first-order approximation of the violation
frequency captured by a model. Figure 3 (left) reveals a tight correlation between accuracy and κ.
Violation budget allocation. The decomposition in Theorem 1 shows how aggregation allocates
one score function to cover all non-violating sets U , and uses the remaining `− 1 score functions
for targeting and handling violating regions. Empirically, this suggests that κ should vary across
choice sets: high κ for targeted violating regions, low κ for U and all other regions. Figure 3 (right)
compares the violation capacity of SDA MNL, and Deep Sets. For each method, the diagram shows
average κ values partitioned according to intersecting correctness regions (i.e., examples that only
SDA was correct on, examples that SDA and MNL were correct on but not Deep Sets, etc.). The
results highlight how SDA efficiently allocates its violation budget, executing very little violation
capacity on examples that MNL is correct on, and allocating the minimally necessary amount to the
rest. In contrast, MNL hos no violation capacity (as it cannot express violations), and Deep Sets
over-utilizes its unconstrained capacity to violate.
Comparing aggregators Claim 1 states that SDA generalizes many aggregation models from the
literature, and by preserving their structural form (i.e., Eq. (5)), introduces useful inductive bias.
Figure 3 (center) compares the performance of SDA to the models from Claim 1 on Amadeus. As
can be seen, SDA clearly outperforms other models. Many of these models were designed for
mathematical or behavioral tractability, having simple components with light parameterization. These
results demonstrate the benefit of replacing these with highly flexible parametric neural components.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a method for accurately predicting choice. Human choice follows complex
and intricate patterns, and capturing it requires models that on the one hand are sufficiently expressive,
but on the other are specific enough to be learned efficiently. Our goal in this paper was to show that
aggregation strikes a good balance between expressivity and specificity, in theory and in practice.
Our work is motivated by the growing need for methods that are accurate and scalable. Aggregation
is a good candidate for two main reasons. First, aggregation accounts for general violations without
imposing any structural assumptions. This is important since accurately predicting choice is likely
impossible within the confines of IIA or of targeted forms of violation. Second, it provides a simple
template into which differential components can be cast. Aggregators can therefore capitalize on the
success of discriminative learning and neural architectures to efficiently optimize predictive accuracy.
There are two main avenues in which our work can extend. First, our theoretical results explore the
connection between generalization and violation of IIA. We conjecture that this connection runs
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deeper, and that a properly defined “violation complexity” can be useful in giving exact characteriza-
tions of learnability. Second, our work focused on a rudimentary choice task: choosing an item from
a set. There are, however, many other important choice tasks, such as sequential or subset selection,
posing interesting modeling challenges which we leave for future work.
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Appendix A Inductive Bias
As stated in Claim 1, SDA with inductive bias Eq. (5) generalizes many models that have been
proposed in the discrete choice literature. Below, we summarize the specific choices of w, r and µ in
each paper.
Type Extends w r µ
- MNL ([20]) one zero identity
SDW
[40] (max-min)ρ zero identity
[19] linear log
∑
exp log
[11] softmax zero identity
[26] linear w. average kinked lin.
SDE
[12] sum min log
[13] (LAM) sum (max+min)/2 kinked lin.
[13] (CCM) sum min power(ρ)
SDA [13] (NCCM) max-min min norm. pow(ρ)
SDA (ours) set-nn set-nn kinked tanh
Table 2: Discrete choice models as set-aggregation models.
As discussed in Sec. 4, we chose our specification of SDA based on set neural networks and a ’kinked’
tanh function. In Appendix D.4, we describe each part of our model in further detail.
Appendix B Approximation Error
We begin with some useful definitions and lemmas due to [1], rephrased to align with our setup. We
then briefly highlight the differences in setting and results between our paper and [1]. Finally, we
give the proof of Theorem 1.
B.1 Definitions and lemmas from [1]
As in many works in economics, [1] use the concept of item utility functions u, mapping each item
to a scalar representing its utility. From our point of view, a score function f correspond to a utility
function if it is fully parameterize, i.e., has one parameter for every item that represents its utility. We
will think of u either as functions u(x) or vectors ux in appropriate context. We use u to define a
collection of utilities ui in the same way that F represents a collections of score functions fi, and
accordingly define gu as an aggregator of utilities u.
It will be useful to notationally differentiate the aggregation mechanism M , which is the functional
form defining how individual score functions are combined, from aggregator classes G, which include
the actual aggregators (i.e., functions), whose form is given by M .
Definition 4 (Triple basis, [1]). Let M be an aggregation mechanism and k ∈ N, then u = {ui}ki=1
with ui ∈ R3 is a triple basis for T = (x1, x2, x3) under M if:
1. gu(x1, {x1, x2}) > gu(x2, {x1, x2}), and
2. gu(x, s′) = gu(x′, s′) ∀s′ 6= {x1, x2}, x, x′ ∈ s′.
where gu denotes an aggregation with item values given by u.
When used in an aggregator, triple bases serve two purposes: they determine the choice from {x1, x2},
but make sure this does not effect choices in other choice sets. Triple bases can be extended to handle
set-triples (x, s, t), x ∈ X , s, t ⊆ X with x ∈ s, where x plays the role of x1, subsets s′ ⊆ s the role
of x2, and subsets t′ ⊆ t the role of x3: the triple bases will choose x from s′ (when x ∈ s′) and will
be indifferent otherwise. The following excerpt from the main proof of [1] (stated here as a lemma)
formalizes this notion. As we now consider multiple items, it will be useful to think of utilities u as
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mappings from items to scalar utilities, u : X → R,7 and we will use both representations of utilities
(as vectors and as functions) interchangeably.
Lemma 1 (Triple basis for sets, [1]). Let u = {ui}ki=1 with utilities ui : X → R, and consider some
set-triple (x, s, t) with x ∈ X , s, t ⊆ X and x ∈ s. If each ui(z) is the same for all z ∈ s \ {x} and
is also the same for all z ∈ t, then if u is a triple-basis for some (x1, x2, x3), it is also a set triple
basis for (x, s, t), in the sense that:
1. x is chosen from any s′ ⊆ s ∪ {x} with x ∈ s′, and
2. u is indifferent on all other choice sets, i.e., those without x or that include items from t.
Triple bases serve as the main building block in [1]. The surprising finding in [1] is that once a triple
basis is known for an arbitrary triplet (x1, x2, x3), using Lemma 1, it can be applied to any violating
set s by setting x = y and t = X \ s. Hence, the existence of a triple basis is a property of the
aggregation mechanism, and not specific to certain items or choice sets (and in our case, to score
function classes or the distribution). The authors of [1] provide explicit constructions of triple bases
for several aggregation (a.k.a. ‘multi-self’) models from the literature, as well as a general recipe that
applies to a large class of aggregation mechanisms that satisfy, in addition to certain natural axioms
(e.g., Neutrality and Consistency), the property of scale invariance:
Definition 5 (Scale invariance, [1]). An aggregator gu is scale invariant if there exists an invertible
and odd function Φ such that for every α > 0, gαu(x, s) = Φ(α)gu(x, s) for all x ∈ X , s ∈ X.
Hence, for any aggregation mechanism that satisfies Def. 5 there exists some triple basis u. Further-
more, the authors show that u includes at most k = 5 utilities. Scale invariance simply means that
the ranking over items (and hence prediction) induced by the aggregator do not depend on the scale
of their internal score functions, and hence, scaling these does not change predictions. Accordingly,
and following [1], our results herein apply to such mechanisms, for which we assume the existence
of a corresponding triple basis.
The authors of [1] show that all of their results follow through when exact triple bases are replaced
with approximate triple basis, where the equalities hold only up to some precision . This will also be
the case in our proof.
B.2 Comparing our setting and results to those of [1]
Before proceeding with our proof, we describe the differences between our result and those of [1],
thus highlighting some of the challenges encountered while proving our result.
The setting of [1] differs from ours in three crucial aspects. First, they focus on a realizable setting:
they assume the existence of a choice function c : X→ X designating choices y = c(s) ∈ s for all
s ∈ X, and aim to recover it from the class of all choice functions. We, on the other hand, focus on
the agnostic setting, where labels (i.e., choices) y are not necessarily generated from a function within
the class we consider (and in fact, can be sampled from an unknown conditional distribution DY |S).
Second, [1] provide worst case results for the successful reconstruction of c from any collection of
labeled examples. In contrast, we focus on a statistical setting where a sample set of alternatives and
choices are drawn from some unknown distribution. We are interested in minimizing the expected loss,
i.e., the probability of correctly predicting choice from choice sets drawn from the same distribution.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, [1] assume that all items can be given arbitrary scores (which
they refer to as ‘utilities’). In other words, score functions are fully parameterized and can assign
any value to any item. This of course means that the number of parameters required for each score
function (of which there can be many in the context of aggregation) is equal to the number of items,
which in practice can be rather large, and in principle can be unbounded. In contrast, we focus on the
parametric settings common in machine learning, where items are described by features (e.g., vectors),
and score functions are parametric functions of those features. Critically, without the assumption
of full parameterization, the results of [1] break down, as they require the ability to assign arbitrary
values to each item.
7While u is a mapping of items, for notational clarity we write it as a function of (observed) features.
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B.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Let M be a scale-invariant aggregation mechanism as in [1], and let u be a corresponding triple basis
of size k, which we assume fixed throughout the proof. As noted in Sec. 3.1, proof requires that the
class of aggregators G be defined over a class of score functions that is slightly more expressive F ,
denoted F+. Specifically, F+ includes combinations of pairs of score functions from F , given by
F+ = {a(b(x), b′(x)) : a ∈ N , b, b′ ∈ F} where N is a class of small neural networks (2 inputs,
2 layers with 2 units each, sigmoid activations) whose precise definition will be given in the proof.
Note that by construction we will have F ⊂ F+.
To reduce notational clutter we will use ε∗D(·) = ε∗(·) for the minimal expected error and ε∗A(·) =
ε∗(·|A) for the minimal expected error conditioned on the event s ∈ A.
We can now restate a slightly tighter variant of Theorem 1 in finer detail:
Theorem 1. Let M be a scale-invariant aggregation mechanism as in [1] with a triple basis u of
size k. Let G = G(`)F+ be a corresponding class of aggregators of dimension ` defined over the class of
item score functions F+. Then:
ε∗D(G) ≤ pU ε∗U (F+) + min
B∈F`′
∑
b∈B
pΩb ε
∗
Ωb
(F) + pV \ΩB (9)
where ΩB = ∪b∈BΩb, `′ ≤ (`− 1)/k, and pA = P (s ∈ A).
Before giving the proof, we state a practical corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. LetNN,K be a class of neural networks withN ≥ 2 fully connected layers withK ≥ 2
units each and with sigmoidal activations (i.e., multilayer perceptrons). Then if G is defined over
score functions NN,K , the bound in Eq. 9 holds for F = NN−2,K/2.
The corollary shows how for fully-connected neural networks, the error on each violating region is
bounded by the error of slightly less expressive neural networks. The result holds since F+ ⊆ NN,K .
Proof. We begin with two useful definitions.
Definition 6 (Implementation). Let F ∈ (F+)k, then if F (x′) = u(x′) for all items x′ appearing in
a (set-)triple T , we say that F implements T . Similarly, if F (x′) ≈ u(x′) for all x′, we say that F
approximately-implements T .
Definition 7 (Isolation). Let s ∈ X, then if F (approximately) implements the set-triple (z, s,Γ(s))
for some z ∈ s and for Γ(s) = X \ s, we say that F (approximately) isolates s.
Implementation simply states that the values of items in the triple-basis under F are (approximately)
those under u. Isolation considers the implementation of triple bases for which the choice set is s (but
the actual choice z does not matter). As we will see, aggregation will target certain choice sets s by
“isolating” them from others, letting some of the aggregated score functions effect s, but guaranteeing
that others are indifferent to it. Note that implementation and isolation, as well as separation (Def. 3),
are inherited properties, i.e., that if they hold for s, they also hold for any s′ ⊆ s.
For our next lemma, we will make explicit the class N . Each a ∈ N is a neural networks taking
as input vectors of size two and outputing a single scalar. The networks have two fully-connected
hidden layers, each with two units, and sigmaoidal activations. The final layer is a 2-to-1 linear layer.
We parameterize units using r(· ;α, β) = 〈α, ·〉+ β with α ∈ R2, β ∈ R. and use θ ∈ Θ to denote
all of the network’s parameters. A network a ∈ N with parameters θ is denoted aθ. We assume
w.l.o.g. that sigmoidal activations σ are scaled to [0, 1].
Recall that each function f¯ ∈ F+ is composed of a pair b, b′ ∈ F whose outputs are combined via
some a ∈ N , given by f¯θ(x; b, b′) = aθ(b(x), b′(x)). We further denote:
Fθ(x; b, b
′) = (fθ1(x; b, b
′), . . . , fθk(x; b, b
′)), θ = (θ1, . . . , θk)
The next lemma shows how functions in F+ can implement triple bases when separation holds.
Lemma 2 (Neural implementation of triple bases). Let T = (x1, x2, x3), and let b, b′ ∈ F be such
that b separates x1, x2 from x3 and b′ separates x1 from x2, i.e., {x1, x2}bx3 and x1b′x2.
Then, there exists θ ∈ Θk for which Fθ(x; b, b′) (approximately) implements T .
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Figure 4: The auxiliary class N
Proof. We give a general recipe for constructing θ. Assume w.l.o.g. that σ maps to [0, 1]. The idea is
to choose α, β such that σ will give items on the r.h.s. and l.h.s. of the separation operator  values
that are arbitrarily close to 0 and 1, respectively. We now construct each unit of the the neural network
(see diagram in Fig. 4).
• Since {x1, x2}bx3, there exist α, β such that r((b(x), b′(x));α, β) ≈ 1 for x = x1, x2 and 0
for x = x3. This is because σ is a sigmoidal, and hence α and β simply shift and scale the
sigmoid so that the higher-valued x1, x2 are “pushed” towards 1 and the lower-valued x3 towards
0. We denote this unit by r1.
• Since x1b′x2, there exist α, β such that r((b(x), b′(x));α, β) ≈ 1 for x = x1 and 0 for x = x2.
We denote this unit by r2. Note that the values for x = x3 are arbitrary but bounded in [0, 1].
• There exist α, β such that r((r1(x), r2(x));α, β) ≈ 1 for x = x1 and 0 for x = x2, x3. This is
because r1 and r2 contribute 1 to x1, while x2 and x3 never get 1 from r1 and r2. We denote this
unit by r3.
• Because σ is sigmoidal, there exist α = (, 0) with small enough  such that with β = 0, r
approximates the identity function on the first input.8 We denote this unit by r4.
Note that measuring the outputs of r3 and r4 when plugging x1, x2, x3 into b, b′ gives:
r3
(
x1
x2
x3
)
≈
(
1
0
0
)
, r4
(
x1
x2
x3
)
≈
(
1
1
0
)
(10)
which together with the vector e = (1, 1, 1), form an (approximate) linear basis for R3. This means
that any utility ui ∈ u when applied to x1, x2, x3 can be expressed as a linear combination of r3, r4,
and e. Specifically, there exist α, β such that the linear layer (r5) gives 〈α, (r3(x), r4(x))〉+β = ui(x)
for all x ∈ {x1, x2, x3}. Altogether, we get that there exist θi with fθi(x; b, b′) = ui for all i, giving
θ = {θi}ki=1 as required.
Corollary 3. Lemma 2 applies to set-triples (x, s, t) when sbt and xb′s.
Proof. According to Lemma 1, it suffices to ensure that scores for all z ∈ s \ {x} and for all z′ ∈ t
are the same. Since the construction in Lemma 2 applies to arbitrary separable triples, the above can
be achieved by choosing parameters (i.e., scaling and shifting) such that the properties of each ri
hold for all x ∈ s, t.
Lemma 2 give a “template” for generating set-triple bases from a pair of score functions b, b′, where b
determines the choice set s (by separating s from t), and b′ determines the choice x ∈ s (by separating
x from s). This notion is formalized in the next result relating separation and isolation.
Lemma 3 (Separation entails isolation). If b separates s, then for any b′ ∈ F , we have that Fθ(x; b, b′)
isolates s. Furthermore, the prediction is determined by b′, i.e.,
hg
F
(s) = argmax
x∈s
b′(x)
8 Alternatively, N can be defined with only one unit in the second layer.
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Proof. Let z = argmaxx∈s b
′(x), then instantiate Lemma 2 for b, b′ on T = (z, s,Γ(s)).
Note that θ is determined by the aggregation mechanism M (this is because u is determined by
M ). Hence, once θ is fixed, the triple-basis template is fixed, and learning can focus on targeting
choice sets (by optimizing b) and predicting within those choice sets (by optimizing b′). In the
remainder of the we will use θ to denote the template parameters corresponding to u (note that
Lemma 2 implies that such θ exists for any triple basis). Because the approximation in Eq. (10) can
be made arbitrarily small (i.e., by scaling the appropriate α-s), the approximate-indifference of the
implemented triple-basis can also be arbitrarily small. Thus, θ can be made to give -approximate
indifference for any necessary .
We can now define the following class:
Fb+ = {Fθ(x; b, b′) : b′ ∈ F}
which includes all score functions that implement set-triple bases that effect choice sets separated by
b (while predictions can vary across functions according to b′).
Corollary 4. If b separates s, then s is isolated by all F ∈ Fb+.
Isolation will be our main building block for showing error decomposition. For b ∈ F , we denote:
Λb = {s ∈ V : s is isolated by all F ∈ Fb+}
Corollary 4 implies that Ωb ⊆ Λb.
Note that although each Fθ(x; b, b′) includes only two base score functions b, b′ ∈ F , it is in fact
composed of k score functions F1, . . . , Fk ∈ F+, each determined by one of θ1, . . . θk ∈ θ, or in
other words, Fb+ ⊂ (F+)k. We denote by GFb+ the class of k-dimensional aggregators over Fb+.
The following lemma shows how isolation helps in decomposing the error of G. By “isolating” a
separable region of X, a budget of k (out of `) score functions can be allocated to that region, and
aggregation will ensure that these score functions will only effect predictions of choice sets within
the region. This is the main component in the decomposition bound of the error of G.
Lemma 4 (Decomposition by isolation). For any R ⊆ X with Λb ⊆ R and any n ≥ k, it holds that:
ε∗R(G(n)F+ ) ≤ pΛbε∗Λb(F) + pR\Λbε∗R\Λb(G
(n−k)
F+ ) (11)
Proof. Let G′ = GFb+ × G
(n−k)
F+ , i.e., aggregators whose first k score functions give some F ∈ Fb+.
Since G′ ⊆ G, the minimal error cannot decrease:
ε∗R(G(n)F+ ) ≤ ε∗R(G′) (12)
Next, fix some constant c, and denote by G¯ ⊂ G(n−k)F+ the aggregators whose absolute values are at
most c, and by G¯ ⊆ GFb+ the aggregators whose absolute values are at least c.9 Denoting G′′ = G¯ × G¯,
because G¯ ⊆ G(n−k)F+ and G¯ ⊆ GFb+ , we have:
ε∗R(G′) ≤ ε∗R(G′′) (13)
For any g ∈ G′′, since g is an aggregator, we can write g = g
¯
+ g¯ where g
¯
∈ G¯ and g¯ ∈ G¯. We now
consider how different s ∈ R are treated by g
¯
, g¯, and g. If s ∈ Λb, then because g
¯
(x, s) > g¯(x′, s)
for all x, x′ ∈ s, g
¯
‘dominates’ g¯ in the sense that only g
¯
effects predictions, i.e., hg(s) = hg
¯
. On the
other hand, if s ∈ R \ Λb, then because g
¯
⊂ GFb+ , it is approximately-indifferent on s (to see this,
note that due to the inheritance of isolation, there is no t ⊃ s with t ∈ Λb, and so s falls in the second
class of sets from Lemma 1). And since this approximate-indifference can be made arbitrarily small
9Here we make the technical assumption that g(x, s) 6= 0 for all x, s.
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(by adjusting θ as described above), g
¯
does not effect predictions, i.e., hg(s) = hg¯ . Overall, for any
g ∈ G′′, we have:
hg(s) = hg
¯
(s)1{s∈Λb} + hg¯(s)1{s∈R\Λb}
This allows us to decompose the error:
ε∗R(G′′) ≤ pΛbε∗Λb(G¯) + pR\Λbε∗R\Λb(G¯) (14)
and because M is scale-invariant (Definition 5), scaling does not change predictions (and thus does
not change the expressivity of the classes), allowing us to remove the constraints on c:
ε∗Λb(G¯) = ε∗Λb(GFb+), ε
∗
R\Λb(G¯) = ε∗R\Λb(G
(n−k)
F+ ) (15)
Finally, because the predictions of any F (x; b, b′) ∈ Fθ(b) are determined by b′ (Lemma 3), we can
replace GFθ(b) in Eq. (15) with F , and combining Eqs. (12)-(15) concludes the proof.
We now tie all lemmas together to derive Eq. (9). Recall that ` = k`′+ 1. For any B = {b1, . . . , b`′}
with ∩b∈BΛb = ∅, we can iteratively applying Lemma 4 to isolate separable regions until our budget
is depleted:
ε∗D(G(`)F+) ≤ pΛb1 ε∗Λb1 (F) + pX\Λb1 ε
∗
X\Λb1 (G
(`−k)
F+ )
≤ pΛb1 ε∗Λb1 (F) + pΛb2 ε
∗
Λb2
(F) + pX\Λb1∪Λb2 ε∗X\Λb1∪Λb2 (G
(`−2k)
F+ )
≤ . . .
≤
∑
b∈B
pΛbε
∗
Λb
(F) + pX\ΛBε∗X\ΛB (G
(1)
F+)
≤
∑
b∈B
pΛbε
∗
Λb
(F) + pX\ΛBε∗X\ΛB (F+)
where ΛB = ∪b∈BΛb, and the last inequality is due to F+ ⊆ G(1)F+ (note that also F ⊆ F+, giving
the version of the Theorem in the paper).
Because the above holds for any B, we can plug in the optimal B. We now have:
ε∗D(G(`)F+) ≤ min
B∈F`′
∑
b∈B
pΛbε
∗
Λb
(F) + pX\ΛBε∗X\ΛB (F+)
≤ min
B∈F`′
∑
b∈B
pΛbε
∗
Λb
(F) + pV \ΛB + pUε∗U (F+)
≤ min
B∈F`′
∑
b∈B
pΩbε
∗
Ωb
(F) + pV \ΩB + pUε∗U (F+)
The first inequality holds because isolation is an inherited property, and hence the argmin B∗
necessarily has disjoint isolated regions {Λb}b∈B∗ . The second inequality holds because ΛB only
includes sets in V , and ε∗V \ΛB (·) ≤ 1. The third inequality holds since by Lemma 3, separation
entails isolations, and so Ωb ⊆ Λb, meaning that sets s ∈ Λb \ Ωb are assumed to receive the
worst-case error of one (i.e., are “moved” from the error term ε∗Λb to the maximal-error term pV \Ωb ),
concluding the proof.
Appendix C Estimation Error
We begin with the case g(x, s) = 〈w(s), F (x)〉 with:
F (x) = (f1(x), . . . , f`(x)), w(s) = (w1(s), . . . , w`(s))
where wi(s) = w(fi(s)), fi(s) = (fi(x1), . . . , fi(xn)), and each fi(x) = 〈θi, x〉.
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We can write F (x) = x>Θ where Θi· = θi are rows, and denote columns by θ¯j = Θ·j . Note that:
g(x, s) =
∑`
i=1
wi(s)〈θi, x〉 =
d∑
k=1
∑`
i=1
Θikwi(s)xk =
d∑
k=1
〈θ¯k,
(I)︷ ︸︸ ︷
w(s)·xk〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
We now bound the Rademacher complexity of each component.
Rf ≤ X∞
√
2 log 2d
m
([37], Lemma 26.11)
Rw ≤ λ(ρ)w Rf ([37], Lemma 26.9)
R(I) ≤ max
x
‖x‖∞Rw ([37], Lemma 26.6)
R(II) ≤ 2 max
θ¯
‖θ¯‖1·R(I) = 2‖Θ‖1R(I) ([38], Sec. 4)
Assuming ‖Θ‖1 ≤ 1, combining the above gives:
Rg ≤ 2X2∞λρw
√
2 log 2d
m
Using standard Rademacher-based generalization bounds (i.e., [2]) concludes the proof:
ε(G) ≤ εS(G) + 2Rg +O
(√
log(1δ)
m
)
gives the desired result.
We now analyze the case g(x, s) = 〈v, µ(F (x)− r(s))〉, where v ∈ R`, r(s) = (r1(s), . . . , r`(s)),
and ri(s) = r(fi(s)). The Rademacher complexity of each component is:
Rµ ≤ λµ(Rf +Rr) ([37], Lemma 26.6)
Rr ≤ λ(ρ)r ([37], Lemma 26.6)
Rg ≤ 2W1Rµ ([37], Lemma 26.7)
and Rf is as before. Together, this gives:
Rg ≤ 2W1Rµ ≤ 2W1λµ(1 + λρr)X∞
√
2 log 2d
m
which concludes our proof.
Appendix D Experiments
D.1 Datasets
For Expedia and Outbrain, the preprocessed data used to train the models can be found here10. For
Amadeus, the data is not publicly available. Please contact the authors of [23] for the data. Note that
we did not conduct any feature engineering on Amadeus dataset. Here are the details of the features
and the preprocessing steps of each dataset.
1. Amadeus: Each item is a recommended flight itinerary, and user clicks one. Key features
include flight origin/destination, price and number of transfers. User features are excluded
from the original dataset due to privacy concerns. We did not coduct any feature engineering,
and used the dataset from [23].
2. Expedia: Each item is a recommended hotel, and user clicks one. Key features include
hotel price, rating, length of stay, booking window, user’s average past ratings and visitor’s
location. We applied the following standard preprocessing steps for different variable types:
10https://drive.google.com/file/d/1G0Rmsa9M1D5NKbryY4mTmZCX9i6MuY2F/view
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• continuous: depending on the distribution, log or square root transform to make the
distribution look Gaussian.
• ordinal: one-hot encode.
• datetime: get week and month to capture seasonality of hotel pricing.
• categorical: one-hot encode. For those with too many categories, group unpopular ones
as "others".
• new features: we created one new feature, popularity score, based on a popular blog
post on this dataset11.
3. Outbrain: Each item is a news article, and user clicks one. When users see an article, they
also see these recommended articles at the bottom of the page. Key features include article
category, advertiser ID, and geo-location of the views. For preprocessing steps, we followed
one of the leading solutions in the Outbrain click preidiction Kaggle competition12.
Table 3 includes further details.
Table 3: Dataset description
Dataset m |X | max(n) avg(n) d
Amadeus 34K 1.0M 50 32.1 17
Expedia 199K 129K 38 25 8
Outbrain 16.8M 478K 12 5.2 10
D.2 Baselines
As shown in Claim 1, SDA generalizes many known variants of MNL. Our implementation of SDA
is capable of running these specific instances of MNL variants. MNL as well as all the models in
Figure 3 (center) are implemented within our framework.
• MNL: our implementation.
• SVMRank: used an open source code on GitHub13, with minor modifications.
• RankNet: used learning2rank library open sourced on GitHub14.
• MixedMNL: our implementation.
• AdaRank: used an open source code on GitHub15.
• DeepSets: used source code provided by the authors16.
For neural network based models SDA, RankNet, DeepSets, the number of parameters are 816+784d,
525312 + 1024d, 196864 + 256d, respectively, where d is the number of features in a dataset. For a
reasonable range of d, the number of SDA parameters is significantly lower than that of other models.
This further illustrates how SDA reduces model complexity by incorporating inductive bias in clever
ways.
D.3 Setup
Implementation
All code was implemented in Python, using Tensorflow17. The source code can be found here18.
Evaluation Metrics Definition
11https://ajourneyintodatascience.quora.com/Learning-to-Rank-Personalize-Expedia-Hotel-Searches-
ICDM-2013-Feature-Engineering
12Up to Step 5 of https://github.com/alexeygrigorev/outbrain-click-prediction-kaggle
13https://gist.github.com/coreylynch/4150976/1a2983d3a896f4caba33e1a406a5c48962e606c0
14https://github.com/shiba24/learning2rank
15https://github.com/rueycheng/AdaRank
16https://github.com/manzilzaheer/DeepSets
17https://www.tensorflow.org/
18https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KZVbqfVR6QNIpv38y4e8ptzVdbi_GQH4/view
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• top-1 accuracy: the conventional accuracy. 1 if the model choice prediction is the same as the
chosen item, 0 otherwise.
• top-5 accuracy: 1 if the model’s 5 highest probability choice predictions include the chosen item,
0 otherwise.
• mean reciprocal rank (MRR): a rank-based measure commonly used in the information retrieval
literature. Let ranki to indicate the rank of the chosen item in our prediction (by probability).
Then, MRR = 1m
∑m
i=1
1
ranki
. Because we want the rank of the model prediction to be higher
(and thus the reciprocal rank to be lower), the lower MRR the better.
Hyperparameters
For all methods, we tuned regularization, dropout, and learning rate (when applicable) using Bayesian
optimization using an open source library Optuna19. We tuned the hyperparameters on the validation
set for 100 trials of Bayesian optimization. The range of hyper-parameters considered is as follows:
• learning rate: log uniformly sample from 1E-05 ~1E-03
• weight decay: log uniformly sample from 1E-10 ~1E-03
• dropout keep probability: uniformly sample from 0.5 ~1.0
For exponential decay, we used decay rate of 0.95 with decay step of 10 for all models. For batch size,
we used 128 for all models. Finally, we applied early stopping to all models based on the validation
accuracy with an early stop window of 25 epochs.
Computing Infrastructure
We optimized the hyperparameters and trained our model on Slurm Worklord Manager20. All the
training was done on CPUs, and the CPU core type we used are AMD "Abu Dhabi" and Intel
"Broadwell".
D.4 Ablation Study
Details on Model Specification
Recall that SDA is of the form:
g(x, s;w,ϕ) = 〈w(s), ϕ(x, s)〉
We further introduced the general form of inductive bias:
w(s) = w(F (s)), ϕ(x, s) = µ
(
F (x)− r(F (s)))
In this section, we first elaborate on the different components of g to supplement Sec. 2, then justify
our choices of w, r and µ described in Sec. 4.
For a single dimension i ∈ [`] in the embedded space, items are first evaluated using some fi(x) ∈ F .
Then, a “reference” valuation is constructed via a set function ri(s). Next, ri(s) is subtracted from
fi(x) to “standardize” the scores with respect to this reference. As noted in 4, we have found it useful
to generalize this by letting fi and ri be vector valued, and taking their inner product instead. The
item-reference relation is then fed into an a-symmetric non-linearity µ(· ). Finally, all ` valuations
are aggregated using set-dependent weights w(s).
Eq. (5) injects inductive bias inspired by the following key principles in behavioral choice theory:
P1: Asymmetry. Losses and gains are perceived in an a-symmetric, non-linear manner. This is
the hallmark of Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory [10, 43].
P2: Relativity. Valuations are relative, and are considered with respect to a mutual (and possibly
hypothetical) referral item (e.g., [42]).
P3: Integrability. Subjective value is multi-dimensional, and context determines how valuations
are integrated into a single choice (e.g., [40, 44]).
19https://optuna.org/
20https://slurm.schedmd.com/documentation.html
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Proposition 1. g(x, s) in Eq. (5) satisfies P1, P2, and P3.
To see this, note that for each dimension i, item scores fi(x) are compared to a mutual set-dependent
reference point ri(s) via d, satisfying P2. Using a pointwise a-symmetric non-linearity for µ gives
P1. Finally, in accordance with P3, valuations are aggregated in g via w(s).
We now describe our specific choice of components in Sec. 4. We model w(s) and r(s) as set
neural networks [46]. These are general neural networks whose architecture guarantees permutation
invariance, meaning that permuting s will not change the output. For the scalar function µ, we have
found it useful to use a kinked tanh function:
µ(z) = c tanh(z)·1{z<0} + tanh(z)·1{z≥0}, c > 1
which is inspired by the s-shaped utility functions used in prospect theory [17].
Since all four elements of g are differentiable, g can be optimized over any appropriate loss function
(i.e., cross entropy) using standard gradient methods. The learned parameters include the weights
in w and in r, and c for µ. We have noted in Sec. 2 that Eq. (5) encompasses several models from
the multi-self literature. Since these are usually designed for mathematical tractability, they do not
always include explicit functional forms, and use simple non-parametric set operations for w and r.
The predictive advantage of our parametrized model is demonstrated empirically in Sec. 4.
Ablation Study
We now investigate the contribution of each component of SDA in an ablation study.
In 2, we motivated our model choice from the behavioral decision theory perspective. To motivate
our design decisions also from a machine learning point of view, we conducted an ablation study.
In particular, we decomposed SDA into F , `, w, ϕ (which can consist of r, µ), removed each
component, and analyzed the performance. The full set of ablation models is detailed in Table 4 and
the experimental results are presented in Table 5. The experiment setup is exactly the same as Sec. 4.
Table 4: Specification of all ablated models
F ` w ϕ r µ
SDA linear 24 Set NN 〈F (x), r(s)〉 Set NN kinked tanh
SDA with g = tanh linear 24 Set NN 〈F (x), r(s)〉 Set NN tanh
SDA with no g linear 24 Set NN 〈F (x), r(s)〉 Set NN -
SDA with w vector variable linear 24 vector variable 〈F (x), r(s)〉 Set NN kinked tanh
SDE linear 24 vector variable Set NN - kinked tanh
SDW linear 24 Set NN F(x) - -
MNL with w setnn linear 1 Set NN F(x) - -
MNL [20] linear 1 Scalar vector F(x) - -
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D.5 Full Result
We ran our experiments for the following number of maximum items:
1. Amadeus: 10, 20, 30, 40, 50
2. Expedia: 10, 20, 30, 40
3. Outbrain: 12
The result is shown in Table 6.
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